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A  
FULL and COMPLETE  
ANSWER  
TO THE  
AUTHOR  
OF THE  
OCCASIONAL THOUGHTS  
ON THE

Present German War, with a Reply to the  
Considerations on the same Subject.



L O N D O N:

Printed for J. PRIDDEN, at the *Feathers*,  
near *Fleet-Bridge*, 1762.

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A

FULL and COMPLETE

ANSWER, &c.

**T**HE desultory Manner in which the Pamphlet, I am now to consider, is compos'd, does not admit of its being answer'd upon any regular Plan of Reasoning. I shall therefore treat the Author as he has done the Public, by observing very little ceremony.

His Pamphlet begins with a Postscript, in which he endeavours to prove, that we ought to have conquer'd Martinico rather than Canada, and that there can be no manner of danger of our over-conquering ourselves by such an acquisition. This reasoning is, I think, not quite candid, unless the author had prov'd, 1<sup>st</sup>. That the British administration never intended to attack Martinico, or that it ought to have been attacked before we conquered Canada. As to our never intending to attack Martinico, I hope our land and sea officers, by this

B

time



time, have exhibited very strong reasons for the affirmative, and there scarcely, perhaps, is a man of sense in England, who does not suppose, that next to Canada, it ought to be our chief object of acquisition, nor shall I quarrel with our author, should he even give it the preference to Canada. But can he, or any man deny, that it had not the preference, and that we were disappointed of the conquest merely by accident, and at a juncture when our internal state of affairs, did not admit of our sparing a maritime force sufficient for the reduction of it; and yet, what we did spare was strong enough to reduce Guadaloupe. If the reader has a mind to turn so far back as November 1758, he will find a squadron fitted out of nine ships of the line, and sixty transports carrying six regiments of foot, who on the 6th of January following, actually did make an attack upon Martinico, which failed. On the 19th of the same month, another attempt was made to land at St. Pierre in the same island, and that likewise, being found impracticable, the conquest of Guadaloupe followed.

Was it fair in our author to suppress those particulars, while he was professedly writing on the subject, however, they might have been buried, or forgotten, in the rapid variety of subsequent operations and  
suc-



successes? Can any man without farther information read this first part of our author's performance, and imagine that the conquest of Martinico had ever been thought of by our ministry? But in fact, our author has rais'd phantoms, that he may have the pleasure of conjuring them down, Was it ever said in the council, in the parliament, or even in the nation, that the conquest of Martinico would be an over-conquest? No, the ministry, and the public were not unanimous in any one measure more, than in making the reduction of that island, a capital concern. There is, therefore, nothing that the author can urge with regard either to the value, or the propriety of such an acquisition, in which I will not willingly agree with him. I must, however, remind him of a few particulars, which may serve to account for our attack upon Martinico, not being sooner expected than this Year.

In the first place, it is certain, that the nature of the island, and the number of regular troops, and disciplin'd militia upon it, renders the conquest of it a matter of great difficulty. In the next place, if we are to believe all the accounts publish'd immediately after the reduction of Guadaloupe, many of whom seem to have been well attested, the taking Guadaloupe, in some measure, superseded the necessity of *immediate*



ly attacking Martinico, which was universally represented, as being *materially* of less importance to us, than the islands of Guadeloupe, and Marigalante. The fair questions then, which our author ought to discuss, and which the public must decide, are, whether the conquest of Martinico was an object that ought to have diverted our attention from that of Canada; and whether the strength and situation of this kingdom when Canada was conquer'd, admitted of our undertaking both expeditions.

As to the former of those questions, I must absolutely be opinion in the negative, not only because the conquest of Guadeloupe render'd that of Martinico absolutely less *immediately* necessary, but because of the immediate danger our North American colonies were in from the enemies power on that continent. As to the latter questions, no man who remembers the situation of this country during the year 1759, till Conflans's fleet was defeated, can be absurd enough to think, that we could prudently have spar'd, before that time, a force sufficient for an expedition against Martinico, as well as against Canada. But why has it not been attempted since that blow was struck, is another question that may be asked. To this I answer as before, that the taking Martinico became less important  
by



by our taking Guadaloupe ; and let me add, that the settlement of our conquests, and securing our colonies in North America, were matters so lastingly materially to this island, that prudence could not admit of our sooner sending troops, than we have done, from North America. To have sent from hence a force sufficient for such an attempt, must have been the height of misconduct in point of prudence, as well as economy, while we had a force unemploy'd, or that would be soon unemployed, in America, equal to the enterprize.

I shall therefore not mis-spend my own or my readers time, in farther proving, that the conquest of Martinico, which is a capital concern with our author, actually was attempted under the late administration, that it was an object the ministry never lost sight of ; and that the attempt could, with no manner of propriety, have been renewed before this summer. Our authors observations upon the importance of the sugar islands, is what no man in his senses will contradict ; and therefore they tend merely to declamation. As to the cession of Guadaloupe, which was agreed to during our late negotiations with France, it is well known, that the minister against whose conduct our author's pen is pointed, was over-ruled in it, by those who were the loudest in defence of the Considerer's



derer's doctrine against the German war. The sacrifice, said they, is considerable ; but something must be sacrificed — we can do without Guadaloupe ; we cannot do without peace. Our agriculture and manufactures are now bleeding at every pore.

Tho' no subject his majesty has, is a greater advocate than I am for that constitutional responsibility to their country to which ministers ought to be bound ; yet, I can by no means think, that it has been always rightly understood, or moderately exercised. Even the case brought by our author in note p. 4, and 5, is a proof of my assertion. The thirteenth article of the earl of Oxford's impeachment, was founded on his having treacherously advised the ninth article of the treaty of commerce with France, and the giving the French the liberty of fishing and drying fish on Newfoundland. But it is as true, that the whole of that impeachment was a scandalous measure, and disapproved of by every man who was not intoxicated with party prejudices, or wrapped up in personal interest. It would not have been prudent, perhaps it might not have been *safe*, to have published such sentiments, before his present majesty had introduced to the throne, those principles of equity and moderation, whose access to the seat of government in  
former



former times, was but too often debarred up by party rage and domestic distractions.

The earl of Oxford, like another great man, was often obliged to yield to measures that were carried against his own sentiments. There is not, I believe, at this time, a man of sense in England, who would think it equitable, that had the late negotiation with France taken effect and been followed by a treaty, which like that of Utrecht had been approved of by two parliaments, Mr. P. should have been capitally impeached for the cession he had made in favour of the French fishery in North America. To place the injustice of such a proceeding in a still stronger light, be it known to the public, that the very impeachment quoted by the *Considerer* upon the German war in its seventeenth article, accuses the noble lord, that he had not, as prime minister, advised the queen against the destructive expedition to Canada. Why was that expedition destructive? Undoubtedly, because it was unsuccessful; and thus events have even, by parliament, itself been set up as standards of political judgment and constitutional rectitude. Had general Wolfe's expedition been destructive, that is, unsuccessful, I should not have been at all surprized to have heard the *Considerer*, and Mr. P's. enemies, calling down vengeance upon that  
gent-



gentleman's head, as lord Oxford's impeachers did upon his.

Having said thus much in answer to the Considerer's impeachment of the late minister, for not conquering Martinico, (for the considerer has laid the precariousness and difficulty of the conquest quite out of the question) I can by no means be of opinion that he has cleared his way as he goes ; or to speak without a metaphor, that he has proved all he has advanced. Perhaps I may be justified in suspecting, that the consciousness of this deficiency is the chief reason of the immethodical appearance (so different from his former performance) which our author's occasional thoughts exhibit. As I write for no minister and for no party, that of truth excepted, if truth can be said to be of a party, I shall not, with the Considerer, adopt the language of any party or of any minister. But all political reasoning ought to rest upon facts or principles. Had we acquired half the neutral islands, in consequence of the late negociation, I cannot keep in my eye, the *necessary* capitulation of the French on Guadeloupe, the natural situation and the improveable condition of those islands, together with the very practicable encrease of sugar that may be raised in Jamaica, without concluding, (against the Considerer,) that the  
French



French never possibly \* can supply the vast continent of America with the produce of their sugars. But upon the whole, laying aside all precarious contingencies, the English ministry has done, and are now doing the very things the Considerer has pointed out in the West Indies. They retain possession of Guadaloupe. They are attempting the conquest of Martinico. They have taken Dominica, one of the French Caribbee islands, and they are now holding the rod over the French interest in St. Domingo.

The Considerer, or rather occasional thinker, to give a plausible colouring to the picture he exhibits, supposes that some one or other of our ministry has established two maxims that have checked the progress of our arms, and the improvement of our present situation. These maxims are, that we may over-conquer ourselves, and that we may give umbrage to other nations, by pushing our conquests too far. I don't know from whence our author drew his political intelligence; but I can almost venture to say, that he will be at a loss to produce an authority to prove, that any such arguments, either ministerial or anti-ministerial ever were urged in his majesty's council, or even in any of the numerous publications the town has lately been pestered with. It is therefore

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\* See Occasional Thoughts, p. 4.



easy for our author to demolish the paper-kite of his own fabric. Notwithstanding this, nothing is more certain, that a people, that a commercial people, like those of Great Britain, may be guilty of over-conquering. But the epoch of that guilt is not yet approaching. It never has been mentioned, it never ought to be mentioned, till our conquests call upon the mother country for such drains as may diminish her population, or injure her most important interests. Such conquests ought to be avoided, and it certain that such conquests may be made ; but it is as certain that no man in England ever said, or indeed ever thought that the acquisition of Martinico is such a conquest.

Our author \* enjoys another imaginary triumph, in exposing the ridiculousness of our fearing to give umbrage to other nations, by pushing our conquests too far. Pray, Sir, who was, or who is, possessed with such a fear, or where was such an apprehension ever exprest. The right honourable gentleman, who lately resign'd, and who is the object of your animadversion, far from entertaining any such apprehension *broke*, with the other servants of the crown, mercly, as he tells you himself, because they would not *break* with Spain, who is the only power that we can have  
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\* P. 5, and 6.



the smallest apprehension from, in our present situation, because she is the only power who can be jealous of our conquests. Did the right honourable Gentlemen's antagonists express any such apprehension; (for I cannot help believing our occasional thinker to be a kind of a political Drancanfir) or betray any such fear? If they had, undoubtedly they would have countermanded the expedition against Martinico, and he must indeed be a hardy politician, who will affirm, that they have.

Our author next\* proceeds, to attack our conquest of Bellisle as an idle expedition, and seems to think, that the troops, who made it, would have been much better employ'd against Martinico. I have already, in part, given my reason for being of a different opinion; but I really cannot, with our occasional thinker, suppose that the whole importance of the conquest of Bellisle has been yet unfolded to the public view. The occasional thinker is pleased to say, that our enemies laugh at us for having made that conquest, and will scarce take it again when we offer it them. I cannot, however, bring myself to believe, that this indifference on the part of France, is not affected. I shall, nevertheless, be candid enough to acknowledge, that Bellisle, in  
time

\* P. 7, and 8.



time of peace, and for a continuance of years, may be a conquest too expensive for us to maintain. Notwithstanding this, any man who throws his eyes upon the map, must perceive, how important it is by its situation, if we should hereafter think proper to carry the sword into the very vitals of France. A place may be of little consequence in itself, but its situation may render it of the greatest; neither am I so well vers'd in the secrets of the cabinet, as to pronounce, that either the islands of Oleron and Rhe\* were, or are to be the next objects of our arms. Was I to hazard a conjecture, it would be in the negative, and that our minister thought that a war of diversion, may be more successfully pursued in France than in Germany. The absurdity therefore, of sending 15000 men to garrison those two islands, and all the consequences of that supposed absurdity fall to the ground, unless the Considerer had proved, that any man besides himself, had ever adopted such a notion. I shall now proceed to follow our Occasional Thinker, in considering the German war, as a war of diversion; but find myself under the necessity of premising some general observations, which tho' of the highest importance to the question, our author has entirely laid out of it.

\* Ibid p. 7.



Our author \* employs a whole page in quoting a passage from a paper entitled, " The king of England's conduct as elector of Hanover ; in answer to the parallel of the conduct of France with that of the king of England, elector of Hanover, in the year 1758." The passage is as follows, " None but such as are unacquainted with the maritime force of England, can believe that, without a diversion on the continent to employ part of the enemy's force, she is not in a condition to hope for success, and maintain her superiority at sea. — They must be very ignorant indeed, who imagine that the forces of England are not able to resist those of France, unless the latter be hindered from turning all her efforts to the sea." The first general observation I have to make on this quotation, is, that no man, no set of men are infallible in any science, far less in that of politics, the success of which depends so greatly upon experience. Should Mr. P. should all the privy counsellors of Great Britain lay down, as truth, a maxim, that experience and facts prove to be false, their going counter to that maxim, convicts *them* indeed of their fallibility, but ought to convince *us* of their honesty. The right reverend

\* P. 9.



verend personage, who, to his dying day, chew'd the wrong end of the asparagus, because he happen'd to do so at first, has no place in my calendar of philosophers or statesmen. Perseverance in what is wrong is *obstinacy*, it ought not be term'd *resolution*. The right honourable gentleman, against whom our author's press-artillery is levelled, has therefore, I think, if his former and latter declarations and practice appear inconsistent, only giving us a proof that he dont suppose himself to be infallible. Both ought to be examined according to the circumstances under which he spoke or acted. and ought to be judged according to their apparent merits. In philosophy, in divinity, as well as in all other arts and sciences, the mortification a man is reduced to, of contradicting his former opinion, has always been judged to be a proof of candour, nay of magnanimity; and why should not the same judgment take place in politicks, where accidents have so great an influence. This I call a general observation; for I can by no means think it applicable to the case in question.

In the paper quoted by the Occasional Thinker, his late majesty speaks as elector of Hanover, and not as king of England; and the quotation only serves to prove, that his late majesty thought himself under no necessity



cessity of embroiling Germany in a war in order to preserve the English superiority at SEA. I shall readily admit, that the completion of this argument has not been altered by any circumstances or accidents that hitherto have happened. At the same time, however, the argument is entirely restricted to our superiority by SEA. Land operations are out of the question. The paper that has been quoted, was drawn up, we must suppose, by the Hanoverian ministry, (but that fact I shall admit to be immaterial) in the year 1757, when, strictly speaking we had no war with France, but AT SEA. The war between Great Britain and France afterwards took a different turn, for I must insist upon it, that our hostile operations on the continent of America, ought as properly to be termed a land war, as if they had been carried on upon the continent of Europe. It might perhaps appear too captious, should I apply the same observation to the descents our land forces made upon the coasts of France ; therefore I shall omit it.

I will however venture to affirm, that the moment the interests of Great Britain required the regular operations of a land war on the continent of America, it ceased, properly speaking, to be a war AT SEA, and it was to be treated accordingly.

It is therefore in vain for our author to invent



vent periods, which he calls cases \* that elapsed, without our being under a necessity of engaging in a continental war in Europe; because that necessity commenced the moment we were engaged in a continental war in America. The only sensible argument that can be urged, (for I am aware of it) against this observation is, (and I give the Considerer a greater advantage than he has taken to himself) that the French marine was so much reduced before the year 1757, as not to have been able to send troops to Canada, or to any part of the American continent. I shall not dispute this very questionable objection; but admitting the French marine to have been so far reduced, were the powers of Europe at that time so much under the influence of British councils, as to refuse to lend their ships upon *proper considerations* to our enemies? Might they not have tempted the Spaniards, the Swedes, the Danes, the maritime powers of Italy, and even the Dutch to hire out their shipping under French colours? Can the Occasional Thinker deny that they did do it in certain cases which have been greatly prejudicial to the commerce and interest of Great Britain? The public will give me leave to add, that even before the blow the French marine suffered from admiral Hawke,



Hawke in November 1759, they had ships of war sufficient to have escorted and protected such an embarkation.

What then was an English ministry to do, but to give the enemy such a diversion as should disable France, no matter how or where, to send such assistance to her American possessions, as might not only have disappointed our expedition against Quebec, but might have enabled her to have completed her ruinous designs against our North American colonies, which must have terminated in the ruin of Great Britain's commerce, if not of her constitution, for I cannot help thinking, that they are connected together.

I now come to the most important period mentioned by our author\*, which is, That, after the defeat of the French Fleet by admiral Hawke, the war in America had been neglected ; and that, by the late negotiations for peace, we had consented to give up for Germany, all the advantages we had gained in the fishery, and sugar trade. Though this objection has been again and again hackney'd, and as often answered in other publications ; yet I shall here pay it some regard. That the French fleet was greatly disabled by the sea fight off Bellisle, I shall admit, that it was totally ruined I  
D deny

\* P. 14, 15, &c.



deny. Our author while he is amplifying, beyond all truth and credibility, the land force of France, is equally unreasonable in depreciating her marine. Nothing is more certain, than that, even after that engagement, had it not been for the powerful diversion our troops gave to France in Germany, in which 130,000 of her best men were employed, a few months would again have put her in a condition to have insulted our coasts. I know how very apt we are, in seasons of tranquility or prosperity, to ridicule the threats of an invasion ; but I never found it fail, at the same time, that the very men, who, at such times made themselves the most merry, when the danger carried an appearance of reality, were the most terrified. But says our author, their navy by the sea fight of Bellisle, was rendered irrecoverable during the present war ; “ without ships, continues  
 “ he, without seamen, and without trade,  
 “ how is it possible for them to raise a ma-  
 “ rine, which can be in the least degree  
 “ formidable to ours ?” I dont apprehend they can. But the duke de Choiseul can best answer, whether, tho’ they could have raised no marine formidable to ours, they might not have commanded ships enough to have given us such alarms, as might have carried dismay and destruction into every recess of our public credit, which, by disap-  
 point-



pointing those alarms has been so carefully preserved. The author has printed a list of the French ships taken and destroyed in the course of the war, which he makes to amount to 47 of the line of battle, and 84 frigates. It would however greatly puzzle our author, to authenticate this list down to the 1st of October 1761. One of the authors from whom his list is taken, and who signs himself J—s S—n in the annual register for the year 1760 page 259, has very well accounted in a marginal note, for the largeness of the French loss. “ The ships “ says he, in the Vilaine are ruined, I *sup-* “ *pose*. But let us *suppose* that gentleman’s *supposition* to be groundless, and that above 17 sail of the line of those ships in the river Vilaine have been since rendered serviceable, and that they are now ready to put to sea ; what then becomes of our author’s calculation ? Un-authenticated lists from public papers, are, in this country especially, doubtful. Monsr. Conflans, the French admiral in that engagement, in his letter to the count St. Florentin, the French secretary of marine, whom he surely would not endeavour to impose upon, dated at Vannes in Bretagne, November 22, 1752, gives a very different account of the matter. He says that the formidable struck to admiral Hawke, that the Soleil Royal, and the Hero were  
burnt



burnt next morning ; that the *Juste* was lost on a rock in the mouth of the river Loire ; but he ends his letter as follows, “ the remainder, says he, got safe into Rochfort “ and the river Vilaine ; and as they have “ not sustained more damage than may be “ soon repaired, I expect, by the junction of “ *Monf. Bompert's* squadron, to be soon able to give a good account of the enemy, “ notwithstanding they have the boldness to “ moor upon our coast.” After so pregnant a quotation, the reader is left at liberty to judge for himself, whether he is to believe our author, who retails his list from a common news paper, or the report made by the French admiral to his master's secretary of marine. If he is still in doubt, let him enquire of the British officers and seamen, who for these two years past have been constantly watching the French fleet upon that station. If the French marine is so despicable as our author represents it to be, where is the occasion for so formidable a force to observe its motions ? And yet I never have heard of a speaker or writer, either within or without doors, who has ventured to condemn the measure. I shall, for once, even allow, that the French of themselves, were unable to repair the damage they suffered ; but let us observe what has been said by a minister and  
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an admiral of our own, whose testimonies must be admitted to be unexceptionable.

General York in the memorial presented to the States General on the 29th of September 1759, (no more than twenty-two days before the engagement off Bellisle,) loudly complains to their High Mightinesses of a contraband trade carried on by the Dutch in favour of the French, consisting of cannon and warlike stores, brought from the Baltic to Holland in Dutch vessels, and then smuggled in rivers and canals, and through fortresses to Dunkirk, and other places belonging to the French king. This was not the first complaint of that kind, made by the same minister to their High Mightinesses. On the 27th of December 1758, he presented a like memorial to the deputies of the States General, complaining, and surely not without ground, that a great number of Dutch ships had passed by the British harbours, laden with all sorts of materials for building and repairing the enemy's fleets; and he very justly affirms, that such naval stores are as prejudicial as balls and gunpowder. All the vigilance of the English fleets could not prevent our enemies being supplied by them, and it is well known, that, ever since that time, the French have been supplied by the Dutch and other nations, with such materials for ship-building,



building, as has rendered, or very soon will render, their fleet as strong as it was before the engagement off Bellisle. The dependence we ought to have upon our good friends the Dutch, may be further seen in a letter from admiral Boscawen to the secretary of our admiralty, in answer to a memorial deliver'd in by the Dutch deputies, complaining, that some Dutch merchantmen had been searched by his order near Cape Palos ; and in this answer, the admiral expressly says, that he had *certain advice*, that the Dutch and Swedes carried powder and other warlike stores to the enemy ; and in another part of that letter, he says, “ as it is well known, that the  
 “ Dutch merchants assist the king's enemies with warlike stores, I think I did  
 “ no more than my duty in searching the  
 “ vessels bound to those parts.”

I shall not here attempt to prove, what is but too certain, that the blow the French marine received off Bellisle, would not have disabled them from renewing, and even executing, their threats of an invasion, had all our dependence been upon our ships. Can we imagine that Spain, whom we have now but too good reason to believe, is in a common interest with France ; that the Dutch, the Swedes, and the Genoese, would not have lent them ships for hire. We must have



have had, it is true, even in that case, a superior fleet ; but who can answer for the accidents of the wind and tide ? If we look into the joint letter, written by the captains of the French ships of war blocked up in the river Vilaine, dated December 17th, 1759, we see, that the first easterly wind, could have brought them out ; and the precarious dependance upon such accidents, must have been highly blameable, where so much was at stake ; especially, as this nation has had so great experience of the uncertainty of that element.

It is therefore easy for our author, to declaim against an expensive German war ; to figure away upon the superiority of our marine to that of France, and to impeach our ministry for not taking the French sugar islands. But how does the matter stand, when all those objects are collected into one point of view, which regards the interest of Great Britain ? For a wise ministry will act as little partially as they can, that is, they will unite as many considerations as they can together, and follow what is best upon the whole.

We shall suppose the right honourable gentleman, who lately resigned the seals of his office, to have been, for some years, the first minister of this government, and as such,  
 answer-



answerable for the measures it pursued. The situation he was in, did not suffer him, as the French government evidently did, to detach the consideration of one measure from another. The French government I say, evidently did that, by attacking our allies in Germany, that they might secure their own usurpations in America ; a proceeding, perhaps, not more unjust than it was absurd. The great objects, therefore, the British minister had under his eye, was to check the French encroachments in America , and to secure, or retrieve our own possessions there, but without losing sight of the internal quiet of this country, or the interests of our allies in Germany.

Before I proceed farther in this argument, it is necessary to make one observation, which our Occasional Thinker has entirely, and designedly, left out of the question, though it ought to be inseparably connected with his subject. What I mean, is the good faith that is due to our allies, and the real, solid, not speculative, advantages that nations, (and the people of England, more than any other) have always acquired, by the punctual observance of that good faith. I shall, at present, leave our engagements with the king of Prussia, out of the question, by confining myself to the  
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the consideration of Hanover only ; a country which we are obliged by every tie of good faith, and if there exists a principle higher than good faith, by every tie of that principle to protect and defend after the generous sacrifice which its master made of its safety on our account. At the time he rejected the shameful neutrality for that electorate, there was not a man of any party in England, who did not applaud his magnanimity, and acknowledge that, in so doing, he had made the interest of his *royal* dominions his first care. How those acknowledgments came to be retracted, is another consideration. I cannot however, felicitate the author of the considerations, upon the completion of his gloomy predictions, concerning the prodigious superiority of the French troops on the side of Hanover. We have now seen the campaign over, and the French baffled in every attempt they have made to render themselves masters of that electorate ; and we now see they are making such dispositions of their dislocated army, as plainly indicate, that they think very differently from our author, and that they have mistaken their measures, in so obstinately pushing, as they have done, the war in Germany. But I shall now return to the objects I suppose the British minister

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to have had under his eye, in the prosecution of this war.

The checking the French encroachments in America, and the securing or retrieving our own possessions there, were objects intimately connected in the eye of the British government ; for I cannot go so far as to say, that the late minister was the sole director of all our operations, either successful, or unsuccessful, during the course of this war ; at the same time, I shall not rob him of the honour and credit, of having the most considerable share of *any one subject* in the direction. Quiet at home, by which I mean a deliverance from all apprehensions of danger, be those apprehensions well or ill founded, was absolutely necessary for enabling the minister to raise the supplies, and the nation to spare the force, sufficient for our purposes in America. The public here were pretty well satisfied, that our fleets, when properly conducted, or when no unfavourable accident interpos'd, were superior to those of France. That consideration however, did not free people from great uneasiness, at seeing 50 or 60,000 French troops, lying over against our coasts, waiting for the first spurt of wind that might be favourable for them, and unfavourable for us, to waft 18 or 20,000 of them over to England, or to Ireland. This produc'd the  
mea-



measure, which has been so much ridicul'd, and which I shall not attempt to defend, of sending for the Hanoverians and Hessians. Every one knows the unpopularity of that measure; that our militia was, at that time, in no condition to oppose an enemy as they are at present; and that the national indignation hurried our auxiliaries back to their own country.

Such was the situation of things, previous to the formation of the army of observation, under his R—l—H—s the D— of C—d. Such was their situation, when that army recommended hostilities, when Prince Ferdinand put himself at its head, and when, once more, they fought *Pro aris et focus*, At this juncture, the third consideration of the British minister I have mentioned, viz. the interest of our allies, presented itself, and was happily combin'd with the other two. It was evident, that when the French had such a force ready to invade us, the internal quiet of Great Britain could not be preserv'd, nor our public credit kept up, unless some diversion was given to that force. The successes of his serene highness prince Ferdinand against the French, render'd that a practicable measure, which before was impracticable. The force we sent to Germany, gave that diversion to the French arms, which our situation requir'd, and indeed implor'd,



implor'd; and tho' I am far from saying that our descents upon the French coasts, were, in themselves, of any great national importance, yet, I must be of opinion, that they cooperated in removing from the minds of the people, their gloomy apprehensions from the power of France, which always strongly affect our internal quiet, and public credit.

Thus, at last, the three capital objects our ministry had in view, became connected. The diversion we afforded to our allies in Germany, favour'd by the prodigious losses they sustain'd in that country, oblig'd them to call their best troops, with the utmost precipitation, from the sea coasts of Brittany and Normandy, and to pour them into Germany; by which, the internal repose of Great Britain being secur'd, she was enabled to consult her American interests; and the event answer'd accordingly, in the conquests of Canada and Guadaloupe, and the reacquisition of our own possessions, upon the American continent.

I hope I have fairly and candidly stated the general views and interests, of the British ministry and nation, in the present war. I have represented them in the same light, as the late minister and his friends always exhibited them; nor do I believe, while their great system was going forward, was there  
the



the smallest difference or doubt, either in the great, or the inferior councils of the nation, as to its being founded upon rational, British, principles.

But our author \* quotes a great authority, which at the end of the year 1756 said “ the unnatural union of councils a-  
 “ broad, the calamities, which in conse-  
 “ quence of this unhappy conjunction, may,  
 “ by the irruptions of foreign enemies into  
 “ the empire, shake its constitution, over-  
 “ turn its system, and threaten oppression to  
 “ the protestant interest there, are events,  
 “ which must sensibly affect the minds of  
 “ the nation, and have fixed the eyes of  
 “ Europe on this new and dangerous cri-  
 “ sis.” Our author affects to say, that till that time we had never openly avowed the cause of the *petty* German princes ; and he is so inconsistent with himself, as to say this in a note upon a passage in the considerations in which he expressly admits, that the independency of the several German states established by the treaty of Westphalia, is what the German princes call the liberties and constitutions of Germany. Our author had acted candidly, had he informed his readers, that the repartition of power in Germany, established by the treaty of Westphalia, was guaranteed by the house of Bourbon, in op-  
 position

\* P. 20, 21.



position to that of Austria. I shall admit that France, since that time, has often made a bad use of this guaranty; but it must be admitted, at the same time, that the moment the two houses of Bourbon and Austria, ran into one another arms, that guaranty was *virtually* at an end; and the German constitution was deprived of that barrier which was always opposed to the encroachments of either family. This is the meaning of the words quoted from his late majesty's speech. They have not the least reference, as our author asserts they have, to the cause of the petty German princes. Every one knew then, and every one sees now, that when they are not supported by France against Austria, or by Austria against France, they can have no will of their own, and far less when France and Austria are united in the same cause. Taking his majesty's words in the above light, it is the language of all the protestant governments and parliaments that ever existed in this country. The throne spoke that language under queen Elizabeth; the parliament and people spoke it under James and Charles the first and Charles the second. The throne resumed its right of speaking it again, under king William, queen Ann, and king George the first; and the above quotation from his late majesty's speech, is perhaps a more modest expression of  
of



of the same sentiments, than can be produced in the speech of any of his protestant predecessors, if we except the latter years of queen Ann's reign.

Happily for the Germanic constitution, three *great*, not *petty* German princes, stood by the system of its constitution, and resisted the oppression of the Protestant interest there. Had they not acted so, what must have been the consequence to this nation? And as they did act so, what was this nation to do? especially as it was in her power, through the injustice of her enemies, to blend in the same cause, the support of the Germanic liberty, and of our American interests, which were the primary objects of the present war.

I shall just mention, as a proof of my candour, and of my endeavouring to avoid all captious disquisitions, that our author is in the right, when he says, "That the interest of England, and the peace of Europe, has always led us to wish rather to see some one great power established in Germany, which should be the natural rival of, and balance against the power of France." But he is mistaken in his application, if he wou'd thereby insinuate, as he certainly does, that the house of Austria, either ought to be, or can be, at this time, or ever since the beginning of this war, that *one great* power. It is well known, that the  
house



house of Austria has always been the oppressor of the Germanic liberties ; and that they have been more than once sav'd by the house of Bourbon ; not from any virtuous principle, but on account of the immemorial antipathy, that, till the beginning of this war, reasons of ambition had always dictated to her, against that great rival of her power upon the continent.

I am sorry to say it, but it is certain that our author, in the same page, has caught at a little advantage, by giving quotations from a despicable French pamphlet, written pretendedly to answer him, but in reality to serve the purposes of Jacobitism. The pamphlet is intitled, " *Le faux patriote anglois,*" and I should never have thought of mentioning it, had it not been quoted by the *Considerer*. In answer to the question he makes \* " is there any sort of œconomy in  
 " our having in three years time put our-  
 " selves to an expence of twelve millions, to  
 " prevent France from getting six hundred  
 " thousand pounds out of Germany?" Without having recourse to any dangerous comments upon the act of settlement, I shall only say, that the question is not fairly stated, unless the author can prove, that we had no other motive for spending those twelve millions, (if we did spend so much) than that of preventing France from getting six hundred  
 dred



dred thousand pounds out of Germany ; which I hope I have fairly proved we had.

Our author spends two or three pages \* in proving what never was disputed, that the French can conveniently bring a great many more troops into the field than we can. He might have added Mr. Byng's plea, that the French ships went much better than ours, and that their metal was much heavier. These are arguments, that before the present war, might have had weight ; but they have now lost all their efficacy. There never was a battle in which, when the engagement began, all circumstances, (the superiority of numbers and cavalry excepted,) were more equally ballanced than that of Minden was ; yet the English beat the French in that battle, tho' the French in point of number and cavalry were superior to the English, in the proportion of ten to one. We may almost make the same observation on all occasions, when the English were in the smallest degree upon an equality with the French, as to artillery or ground. The same observation holds good as to the sea service, at least ever since the execution of Mr. Byng : We have seen English men of war take French ones of double their weight of metal, force and bigness ; ship engaged to ship, or in the sea phrase, yard arm to yard arm.

F

But

\* P. 24, 25, 26, &c.



But was any argument wanting to prove, that an inferiority of numbers on the part of Britain, does not evince a superiority on the part of France, let us have recourse to the testimony of the Considerer's heroes, I mean, the French themselves, in No. 17, article 10. of the printed historical memoir, where there  
 " king undertakes, that, from the time that  
 " his Britannic majesty does recall the En-  
 " glish whom he has sent to his army in  
 " Germany, he will cause double the num-  
 " ber of French forces in his Majesty's ar-  
 " mies on the Upper and Lower Rhine, to  
 " return to France," This, I say, is, on the part of France, a clear confession, that she is oblig'd to keep two French soldiers in Germany for one English one, who serves there. And, indeed, if we look back even to the last war, which cannot be said to have been favourable for us, we shall find, that in all actions, in which the British troops were engaged, they beat double the number of the French. How then, may it be said, came we to be unsuccessful? I answer, because in fact, the British troops had four times their numbers to fight against; and because their allies were rather a dead weight upon them, than of any service to them in the field; witness the battles of Fontenoy and Laval.

The Considerer comes next to retail some  
 scraps



scraps of speeches, which I suppose he heard had been made use of by one minister in the House of Commons, in a very Thrafonical stile, as if he had boasted, that after the battle of Minden, France knew she was sinking\*, &c. It is to me very immaterial, whether those speeches were made use of, or not; and I am not unwilling to admit, that even the most cautious ministers have been known in the warmth of their exultation, for an unexpected success, to have lost sight of their usual caution, and to have launch'd into declamation. But it happens, that the speeches related by our author, supposing them to be genuine, contain in them very little or nothing that is exaggerated, and the event shew'd it. We saw that power, which in the beginning of the war, expected to have erected in America, in a few years, an empire equal, or superior, to that which she has in Europe; to have given the law upon the Mediterranean by the conquest of Minorca; to have extinguished the protestant interest in Germany, by the alliance she made with the court of Vienna, and to have annihilated the English commerce in Asia, by the numerous sea and land forces she sent to the East Indies; we saw that very power, I say, offer to sacrifice, for the sake of peace, all Canada, to restore Minorca, to

\* P. 25.

evacuate



evacuate Germany of her troops, to guaranty the possession of Senegal and Goree, and, in a manner, to abandon her ruined interest in the East Indies ; not to mention the other mortifying concessions to which she submitted.

But says our Considerer, our British war, by which, I suppose, he means, our operations in America, (for surely, he cannot mean those in the East Indies,) during the next year after the battle of Minden totally languished. In answer to this, I shall submit it to the public, nay, to the Considerer's own candour, whether he believes, in his conscience, that the day before the battle of Minden was fought, which was on the 1st of August, 1759, France could have been brought to have made the smallest concession, out of the many great and important, and to her humiliating ones she did make, by her last memorial of the 9th of September, 1761.

This prodigious falling off, (if our author's reasoning is right) cannot be owing to our successes in America, or the East Indies ; for he tells us, that not a single squadron, during eighteen months, after the battle of Minden, sail'd for any new British conquests, nor was a single brigade sent out to any other than a German service. And yet, most true it is, that the French by our  
con-



continuing the war in Germany; (for the Considerer says, we continued it no where else) were brought to agree to more mortifying conditions, than they had ever agreed to since they were a nation; not excepting even the negotiations of Gertruydenburg. I shall only here, just by the bye, observe, that in the last mentioned negotiation, the terms offer'd to be ceded to Great Britain by France, were *immediately* of little, or no peculiar importance to this nation. All her profered cessions, I will not even except the demolition of Dunkirk, either regarded our allies, as well as us, or were obtain'd purely and solely for their emoluments, (witness the barrier negotiation,) without a possibility of Great Britain, either conjunctly or separately, receiving one shilling of advantage by them. The terms offer'd by the late negotiation were for *our* interest, and *ours only*. But his Majesty thought, as every great prince of a great people will think, that whatever reflected dishonour upon his crown, must tend to the prejudice of his subjects. He could not abandon his good faith, he could not abandon that system, which ever has been adapted by his family, and by all the friends of the protestant interest in Europe. The facts, therefore, speak for themselves, and according to the Considerer's own doctrine, it appears, that the cessions offer'd by  
France



France, during the late negotiation, which always will be remember'd with glory in the British annals, were owing to our perseverance in the German war, and to our observing good faith, towards our protestant allies on the continent.

It might be expected, that I shou'd here vindicate our government, from the charge of slackness in pursuing the war in America, and the East Indies, since the battle of Minden. As to the former, I must refer my reader to the preceeding part of this paper, where he will perceive, that our government did not lose a single hour, in continuing its operations in the most effectual manner, against the enemy in America, and the West Indies. As to the latter, the charge is absurd and ridiculous, because we have taken Pondicherry, and obtain'd other glorious successes in the East Indies, by the troops and shipping we sent thither, long before the battle of Minden.

I now proceed to our author's calculations, in which he affects uncontrovertible authorities, and which indeed, is the great political trap of his performance. By the resolutions, says he, of the 27th of November, and the 20th of December, "It appears that  
 " we paid to the Landgrave 426,725 l. for  
 " 19,012 men." In the next page \* he  
 desires

\* P. 27.



desires his reader, "to recollect the very  
 " singular charge of 60,000 l. to be paid  
 " the Landgrave of Hesse, in order to faci-  
 " litate the means, by which he may again  
 " fix his residence in his own dominions."

Would not the most clear sighted accompt-  
 ant in England, (taking those sums upon the  
 Considerer's own word,) believe that the last  
 mentioned sixty thousand pounds, for re-  
 storing the Landgrave to his capital, was a  
 sum quite distant from, and independent of  
 the money we pay him for his troops? How  
 then must the reader be surpris'd, when he  
 knows it is contain'd in, and blended with  
 the 426,725 l. Thus, the great lump for  
 the pay of the Hessians, is reduced to  
 366,725 l. Let us now see how this sum  
 comes to arise ; and let us not, like our  
 Considerer, jumble together all the particu-  
 lars, only with the view of *making his reader*  
*stare.*

The eighth resolution of the house of  
 commons, November the 27th, 1760, as  
 follows, "That, for defraying the charge of  
 " 2120 horse, and 9900 foot ; together  
 " with the general and staff officers, the  
 " officers of the hospital, and officers and  
 " others belonging to the train of artillery ;  
 " the troops of the Landgrave of Hesse  
 " Cassel, in the pay of Great Britain, for  
 " 366 days, from the 25th of December,

" 1759



“ 1759, to the 24th of December, 1760,  
 “ both inclusive ; together with the subsidy  
 “ for the same time, pursuant to treaty there  
 “ be granted a sum not exceeding 268,874l.”

The ninth resolution runs as follows,

“ That, for defraying the charge of an ad-  
 “ ditional corps of 920 horse, and 6,072  
 “ foot ; together with the general and staff  
 “ officers, the officers of the hospital, and  
 “ others belonging to the train of artillery.

“ The troops of the Landgrave of Hesse

“ Cassel, in the pay of Great Britain, for

“ 360 days, from the 1st day of January,

“ 1760, to the 31st day of December fol-

“ lowing, both days inclusive, pursuant to

“ treaty, there be granted a sum not ex-

“ ceeding 97,850 l.” The above two sums,

added together, makes the neat sum of

366,725l. for 19,012 Hessians ; which I

believe will be found to be as reasonable a

change, as has been brought for German

auxiliaries ever since the days of king Wil-

liam.

The second resolution of the house of com-  
 mons of the 11th of February runs thus,

“ for defraying the charge of an augmen-

“ tation of four squadrons of hunters and

“ hussars the troops of the landgrave of

“ Hesse-Cassel, in the pay of Great Britain,

“ from December 25, 1759, to December



“ 24, 1760, both days inclusive, there be  
 “ granted a sum not exceeding 20.776l.”

On the 29th of April the third resolution of the committee of supply was “ for de-  
 “ fraying the charge of two additional squa-  
 “ drons of hussars, and two companies of chaf-  
 “ fleurs, together with an augmentation to  
 “ the horse, dragoons, and foot, the troops of  
 “ the landgrave of Hesse Cassel in the pay of  
 “ Great Britain for 1760, 101,096l. 3s. 2d.  
 “ granted a sum not exceeding 23,843l.”

Thus the neat sum we pay to the landgrave of Hesse for 22404 men, is 487,597l. though the Considerer makes it amount in the whole, to 1,310,573l. Thus the difference in the charge for the pay of the Hessian troops, between the Considerer and me, is 1,177,024l. This is a difference so amazing, that I have been at great pains to discover from what authority our author could take the particulars of his charge. One article for the Hessian share of forage, is 541,975l. 18s. 1d. I have carefully look'd over the supplies granted for the years 1758, 1759 and 1760, and find the article for forage, &c. in those three years stands as follows ; but I am under a necessity of laying all the words of the resolution of parliament before my reader, that he may know to what particulars our authors general words of forage and extraordinaries extend.



On the 3d of April 1758, the committee of supply came to the following resolution, viz. to give in full satisfaction for defraying the charges of forage, bread, waggons, train of artillery, and train of provisions, wood, straw, &c. and all other extraordinary expences, contingencies, and losses whatsoever incurred, and to be incurred on account of his majesty's army, consisting of 38,000 men actually employed against the common enemy, in concert with the king of Prussia, from November 28 last, to December 24 next inclusive, the said sum to be issued from time to time, in like proportions as the pay of the said troops 386,915l. 13s. 2d. On December 18, 1759, for defraying the charges of the forage, bread, bread-waggons, &c. of prince Frederic's army, there was granted to his majesty upon account as a present supply, 500,003l. In the year 1760, January 17. there was granted on the same account, as a present supply 500,000l. In the year 1761 there was granted for the same account 1,000,000. So that the whole charge upon Great Britain for forage, &c. from November 28, 1757, to December 24 1761, is 2,386,915l. 13s. 2d.

Either the Considerer, if I am right in the above account, or I must be guilty of something that deserves not quite so soft a name  
as



as a blunder. The confiderer \* exprefsly charges to the Hessian accounts of forage paid by Great Britain for the year 1760, as being one fourth of 2,169,903l. 12s. 6d. (from this account I fuppose he deducts from my general charge the intermediate time between Nov. 28, 1757, to Dec. 24 the fame year) the fum of 541,975l. 11s. 1d. I, on the contrary, maintain, that this fum is the expence of four years; fo that the expence of the Hessian proportion, admitting it to be a fourth of the whole for forage, &c. for the year 1760 amounts, according to my account, to no more than 135,243l. 5s. 9d. fo that the difference between us in this fingle article is 406,243l. 12s. 4d. which muft be fubmitted to the candour of the public to judge upon.

Before I take my leave of thofe forage contracts, which I admit to be expenfive, fome readers may expect I fhould touch on the reasons why they are fo, while others may think that to be needlefs. My furprize, indeed is, that the expence is not quadruple, nay, that in a country exhausted of provifions of all kinds by a long war, every corner of it filled with troops which leave not hands to cultivate the land, that forrage or provifions of any kind are to be got for money. The French and their horfes, though they perhaps

\* P. 28,



haps may not have so good stomachs for fighting, have as good for eating and drinking, when they can come at the means, as either Britons or Germans. Westphalia in general is far from being reckoned a fertile or well cultivated country. The French have for some time been in possession of the landgraviate of Hesse. Hanover is secure chiefly by its inability to furnish more forage or provisions than can keep together the lives and souls of its miserable inhabitants; and the profest maxim of the French is, to make both the electorate and the landgraviate a military desert\*. I mention those particulars the rather because they serve as an answer to the main charge brought by our author against the German war, and which is disseminated through the whole of his occasional thoughts and his considerations, I mean the vast expence that attends it. Had he previously proved the point, which he has very slightly and very ineffectually attempted to prove, that the principles on which Great Britain entered into the war on the continent are wrong; the expences she is at in maintaining it, were they nine parts in ten less than they are, would have been too great.

I now come to our author's next charge against the œconomy of the British government,

\* Vide Belisle's letter to Contades.



ment, which is placed to the account of the year 1760, viz. "For releasing the Landgrave's enemies from a *dedommagement*, and taking upon ourselves, the obligations to grant him a reasonable succour in money 220,000 l." Least an Antigallican reader, or one who does not understand French, should be at a loss for the meaning of that same cramp word *dedommagement*, he must be informed, that it signifies no more than an indemnification for the losses the Landgraviate of Hesse Cassel may have sustained by the residence and ravages of the French in his Dominions, and which, it seems, we were obliged to make good by treaty. The reader, however, is to remember, that no resolution for this purpose, stands upon the votes of the House of Commons, tho' in the account given us by the Occasional Thinker \*, he has inserted the following article, "March 7, 1761, For a reasonable succour in money, for damage done by the French in Hesse, during the year 1760, settled at 120,000 l. to be paid immediately, and 100200 l. more in two years 220,000 l." I have inspected the votes of supply for that day, and find only two; the first is a vote of credit to his Majesty for a million; the second, is, for paying 120,000 l. on account, towards assisting his Majesty

to

\* To face page 38.



to grant a reasonable succour, in money, to the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel, pursuant to treaty \*. I shall but just appeal to the candour of my reader, whether, on throwing his eyes upon our author's account, and comparing it with the above words of the votes, he can think both mean the same thing. But I will admit that we have paid, or are to pay that sum to the Landgrave of Hesse, and that we have paid to him and his father within these five years 120,000 l. more, to enable them to return to their own dominions. All the Considerer can make of this is, that a people who impeach'd the tory ministry of queen Anne, for not supporting the Catalans, at an expence that would have cost some millions, against their king, merely because they were our allies.—That a people who unanimously gave 100,000 l. as a dedomagement or relief to the Portuguese, when under the afflicting hand of heaven, merely because they were our allies.—That a people who indemnify their American subjects, whom at the same time they protect in their possessions; and even give dedomagements to their own publicans when they suffer, tho' in pursuance of our own acts of parliament. —That such a people, I say, should give a relief of 340,000 l. to a prince the ally and son in law

\* Vide London magazine, July 1761.



law of Great Britain, who is embarked in the same cause with Great Britain, who is suffering for her, who, for her sake is driven from his dominions, where he is unable to raise one shilling of his revenue, and with his wife, the daughter of our late venerable monarch, is reduced to a state of exile and indigence is just and humane. Let the Occasional Thinker now make the best of his argument against our munificence to such a prince.

By what I have said above, the reader may perceive that the Occasional Thinker has blended under one head, viz, the great expence the Hessians cost us, three different accounts, viz. what we have given to the landgrave as an ally and a prince distressed on our account; what we give him for forage, &c. which it is impossible he can furnish without our assistance; and what we pay him for his auxiliary troops, a very small share of which can, at present, go into his pocket.

Our author has observed, that the expence of Hanoverian auxiliaries, is little more than half that of the Hessians. I believe if the reader throws his eye upon the resolutions of the house of commons Feb. 11, 1760, he will find that there is little or no difference in the expence of the troops of the two people, that are newly raised, or to be raised, and that as nearly as can be calculated they  
are



the same. The difference of expence therefore that arises, must be from the Hessians having furnished a greater number of new raised troops ; and from the expence of their train of artillery being included in the money we pay them, which I perceive in the votes, is not the case with the Hanoverians; and this by the bye, greatly diminishes the forage account, which our author has charged to the Hessians, (viz. one fourth of the whole,) because I perceive that the train of artillery, (which cannot be meant of the Hessian artillery) is included in the forage, &c. account. But says our author \* the Russians are much cheaper than either the Hessians, or Hanoverians. The cases will admit of no comparison. We hired the Russians by the lump. The prospect of their assistance, from the time we hired them, was very distant and very precarious. We were to pay their emprefs 100,000l. a year, tho' they never marched out of their own country for four years, and 500,000l. a year if they did. But what weighs with me more than all, is, that the treaty of Petersburg, dated September 19, 1755, by which this bargain is struck, has for its basis, the treaty of Moscow, of December 30, 1742, which is expressly confirmed by the treaty of Petersburg, and by which his Britannic majesty obliged himself;

\* P. 26, 13, 14, &c.



himself; if her imperial majesty was attacked, to send to her assistance, a fleet of twelve ships, the whole carrying 700 guns and 4560 men.

Our considerer \* supposes that the Hessian troops are not compleat; and his answerer has as good reason, nay, much better to suppose that they are compleat, especially as they are under the check of a British commissary, and that of the signature of the commander in chief. The author in the same page, seems to be positive, that the French subsidies do not amount to half of ours; the subsidies they pay may; not but what they promise amount to double. They subsidize Sweden, the empress of Russia and Germany, the Swisses, several other of the Italian states, and, if we are to believe their own writers, even the Danes. those subsidies are most, or all of them, for negative services. They have got nothing by the Swedes; they have got nothing by the empress of Russia, tho' she has got a great deal for herself; they have got far less by the empress queen, if we except the honour of having buried above 150,000 of their best troops in Germany. The Wirtembergers, it is well known, have refused to serve them, the Swiss and Italian states cannot

H

not

\* P. 29.



not serve them, and the Danes give them—a neutrality.

I now proceed to what properly, and truly may be called, the body of our author's pamphlet, tho' it is incomparably the weakest part of his performance. Our author spends some pages \* in proving either what no body will deny, or, that he has proved that, which I have already demonstrated he has not proved. Who can deny that a crack'd-brain'd Scotchman might write nonsense (as he did) from Edinburgh; or, that an expensive German war considered as such, without relation to Great Britain's interest, is not a misfortune to these kingdoms? I shall even be ingenuous enough to acknowledge, that some of our great men (the Considerer and I shall not differ about the identity of their persons) have made loud professions in parliament, and elsewhere, against such a war. Yet what does the Considerer gain by all he has advanc'd, unless he destroys the arguments that have been brought to prove, that the present German war, is intimately and immediately connected with the interest of Great Britain? But far from doing that, our political mathematician, more ingenious than Archimedes, fixes his lever in a chink of his own brain; and from thence attempts to heave from its foundations,

\* P. 31, 32, 33, and 34.



ons, the glorious system of protestant policy that has prevailed for these two hundred years; an æra which I had almost said is coeval with the date of British liberty. Let him proceed in his declamation; let him with Demosthenes, appeal to the shades of the British heroes who fell at the Marathon of Minden. Let him with Cicero, invoke the Alban heights of Fellinghausen; but to what does all this tend? in lawyer terms let him come to the assets. Let us feel substance, let us see the sterling in his reasoning.

The Duke of Brunswick, on November 27th, 1757, had the French rod over his head; and by a train of most unfortunate accidents and incidents, he could not preserve his subjects from being in the most miserable situation. His son, with a magnanimity that has ever been inherent to the Brunswick blood, followed his uncle in the cause of liberty. The father out of tenderness to his subjects, writes a letter, so blended with reproach and tenderness to his brother, that one does not know what to make of it; charging him with a very ridiculous crime, that of kidnapping his son, who was then an infant about three and twenty; and to shew that he did it under compulsion, he sends a copy of letter to his French General; a circumstance which our



Considerer has carefully concealed. The late landgrave of Hesse said, that he desired nothing more ardently, than to put an end to the troubles of the empire; for that is the sum of his declaration; and, undoubtedly, Great Britain joined with him in the same wish. Let the Considerer make the best of those facts, which, if we are to judge by the events which afterwards followed, amount to nothing else than to prove, that should Great Britain leave those two princes to the mercy of the courts of Versailles and Vienna, they would chuse the former; and it was natural for them to do it, as the preferable attachment.

Our author \* next falls foul upon our German Generals conduct. I answer as above; let the narrative of our late negotiations with France answer him. The terms there offer'd, even according to the considerers own confession, did not proceed from our operations in America, or Asia, but from those in Germany, ineffectual as he has represented them to be. Even our generals, says he †, are all hired by their Pensions. A great misfortune truly! But if I mistake not, the great Duke of Marlborough was the same; and I never heard, or read of a general, who was not. Before we can consult œconomy, says he ‡, we must carry the

\* P. 35. † P. 37. ‡ Ibid.



the war from Germany to the French West Indies. Is not that the very thing we have done? Is it not the very thing we are now doing as fast as fleets and armaments can carry it. His arguments against our œconomy, I have in the proceeding pages fully answered and refuted. I can only here add, that our author considers the value of money as being the same that it was thirty, forty, or fifty years ago. That it de-creas'd in the intermediate time in Great Britain, in the proportion of five to three, is plain from the reduction of our national interest. But it may be objected, that the value of money is the same now, as it was in the time of the duke of Marlborough, and of the war in 1743. All evidences are for the negative ; and I believe, that there is not an old banker, or monied man in Europe, who will not agree with me, that we could have done more in those days for 25 l. than we can now do for 30. The Considerer, therefore, puts me in mind of those honest old gentlemen, who are perpetually putting their sons in mind, that when they were young men, and in the Temple, they could afford to live very genteely for fifty pounds a year, whereas these young rakes, cannot live so well for seventy, or eighty ; perhaps, not under a hundred a year.

Our



Our author's comparisons \*, between the expence of our German auxiliaries and our militia at home, is totally absurd. The former, serve in a country, where provisions of all kinds at present are at most exorbitant prices, and their muskets and bayonets are the only means by which they can procure them. Our militia lives in their own plentiful country ; their wives and children are not only supported by the public, but can support themselves, while their husbands, into whatever part of England they are sent, can by their labour earn double what they can do by their arms.

Our author's reasoning in the three subsequent pages †, has been already answer'd; but he may triumph in the remarks he makes upon the Hessian treaty for the year 1760, by which the public is bound to give the Landgrave a year's pay after the end of the war, when he can find out any example in history, a prince so nearly connected with Great Britain, reduced to such deplorable circumstances on her account, as the present Landgrave of Hesse is.

I sincerely agree, and condole with our author upon the ridiculous expensive and useless parade of commissaries, that we have lately sent over to Germany. If I am to judge by former experience, and that of other  
other

\* P. 38. 39. † P. 40, 41, 42.



other troops, I look upon one commissary sent over to controul another in affairs of the army, in no other light, than that of a parcel of jacks or pikes put into a fish-pond, who agree in nothing but devouring the defenceless fry, and who would devour one another, were not each afraid of the other's strength. In short, such fellows as Austrian commissaries, I mean, are as a sort of sharks, and the multiplying them, is multiplying calamities to our suffering countrymen. But this I only speak in general; for I dare to say, *our* commissaries are all honest men, or at least, our minister thought them so, and that those he sent over to be the controllers, are at least as honest as those they were to controul, and perhaps, *vice versa*.

I likewise sincerely lament with our author (if the case is actually such) \* that the effective number of Hessians now in our pay, is not more numerous than the body of the British clergy; and I hope his most Christian Majesty, will join his condolences with ours; because he has actually, at this time more ecclesiastics, and religious in his kingdom, than all his armies in Germany, in their full compliments ever amounted to at one time.

Our author's next four or five pages \*,  
are

\* P. 42. † P. 43, 44, 45, 46, &c.



are merely declamatory, and the little shew of reasoning they contain, has been already fully answered, His subsequent reasoning, to the end of his pamphlet, is pilfered, and sometimes in the same words from other pamphlets, written against the late minister \* If there is in it any thing new, it is, that the absurd conduct of Great Britain, in entering into the German war, has overturned that ballance of power, for which we fought for under King William and Queen Anne. Indeed, my friend that was overturned long before this war had a being. It was overturn'd by the Dutch before the end of the late war. When the French saw, that they had nothing to apprehend from the Dutch, they blew up that barrier, for which our Nassau's and our Marlborough's had fought. The Louvestein faction again, got the ascendancy in Holland ; the French monarchy took the Dutch republic under its wings, and I am sorry to say it, the brood it has hatched has——but I forbear serpentine expressions. Since the time that the grand confederacy against France took place, their military power by sea and land, I mean, that of Holland, has been in a manner, extinguished, while another power then scarcely thought of in Europe, has started up; that of Russia, and  
moves

\* Vide letter 1st to the E of B. p. 18.



moves in its own orbit extrinsically of all other systems ; but gravitating to each, according to the mass of attracting interest it contains.

Another power, against all human expectation, was raised in Europe in the house of Brandenburg, and the rapid successes of his Prussian majesty, prove him to be born to be the natural asserter of the Germanic liberties against the house of Austria. We had been so long accustomed to look up, as I may say, with reverence to that house, and the phenomenon of another great power in Germany was so very new to us, that for some time he was obliged to attach himself to France. France and Austria united, and Great Britain and Prussia coalesced. Such are the great events by which the ballance of power in Europe has been entirely altered since the time of the grand Alliance against France. His late majesty so passionately endeavoured to maintain or revive the antient ballance, that he encountered at home, on that account, opposition to his government, and abroad, danger to his person ; but he could not re-animate the Dutch with the love of liberty, nor inspire the empress queen with sentiments of moderation.

Our author therefore talks at random in the last pages of his performance, when he speaks of the present unhappy situation of

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Germany, as being owing to the mistaken policy of Great Britain. Great Britain was out of the question ; nor could she have interposed in it, without her taking a much greater share, and with more impropriety than she now does, in the affairs of the continent. Our author's head, like many others I have known, who in other respects had very good ones, is too much employed upon the ideas raised by the histories of Great Britain and Europe, during the existence of the system which took place in the times of king William and queen Ann. He reasons upon it as if it still had existence. He imputes the annihilation of it to Great Britain. But he is mistaken in both. He even goes so far back as the times when the people of England thundered to their king in one reign, and the king re-echoed to his people in another, (I mean the reign of Charles the second, and king William) the dangers of universal monarchy from the ambition and power of France. He speaks \* as if all Europe was at war with us, and we with all Europe, and as if this had happened through our own misconduct.

Better be envied than pitied, is a comfortable proverb. Interest is the only tye of friendship between nation and nation ; and Great Britain at present is in as much friendship

\* P. 48.



ship with all the powers of Europe, as she was at the time of the grand alliance which has been so pompously blazoned out by our author, interest only excepted. But from what does that exception proceed, but from envy and jealousy of our power and greatness? and may that cause always exist. To talk as if France was at present an object of terror, not only to Great Britain, but Europe, and as if we had mistaken our interest in not reviving the grand alliance against her, is mere declamation. Her ruined armies now returning from Germany, without being able, through the opposition of a handful of British troops, to carry any one point there during this campaign. The mortifying terms to which she has submitted, not to mention the more mortifying ones to which she must submit, are stronger proofs of what I advance than groundless assertions, without facts, without evidence, without proof to support them. Such assertions speciously introduced, and strongly pushed, as our author has that knack, operate wonderfully in the mind; but I shall close what I have said with a few propositions of which we have the strongest proofs, viz.

First, that the war in Germany disabled the French from prosecuting their ambitious views, and preventing our conquests in America.

Secondly



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Secondly, that Great Britain has done, or is now doing the very thing the Considerer has blamed the government for not doing ; I mean attempting the conquest of Martinico.

Thirdly, that France has been baffled in the German war, that her armies are ruined, that the surviving part of them have return'd with disgrace and disappointment, and that not any one of the dismal events, which our author a twelvemonth ago predicted and figured away upon, has yet happened.

Lastly, to use seriously the Occasional Thinker's ludicrous words, " That France is sinking ; she knows herself sinking ; this is the last effort of a dying power ; 'tis the convulsion of death, the effort of despair : Let us but resist it firmly, let us act with the vigour of success, and we need not fear any thing she can do from despair.' "

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